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INTRODUCTION
A man and his child are walking down the street, heading to a news-
stand to browse a few magazines. They arrive at the stand and are
confused by what they see. The front covers of several magazines are
completely covered by a black page. While this might be common prac-
tice for the adult magazines on the top shelf, on this day, black covers
shield magazines scattered throughout. Surely the man and his child
could just ask the stand owner to remove the covers, but should they
have to? The black page prevents them from seeing any information
about the magazine, so they do not know what kind of material is being
blocked. Should they have to provide the stand owner with a bona fide
reason as to why they want the cover removed? What if the owner is too
busy assisting other customers and cannot help them? What if it turns out
one of the magazines with a black cover has a front-page story about
Vice President Dick Cheney? Another is an art magazine with a cover
story remembering the famous poet Anne Sexton. Yet another contains
headlines on the cover discussing constitutional rights and gay marriage.
Why are the man and his child prohibited from viewing these covers?
On June 23, 2003, the United States Supreme Court decided United
States v. American Library Association, Inc. (ALA),' a case that effec-
tively made the situation above a reality, not with regard to print media,
but to Internet content in public libraries. The Court in that case upheld
the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), which provides that public
libraries must install Internet filters on library computers to receive fed-
eral funding.2 This ruling will affect millions of people who log onto the
Internet from public libraries. This is because while Internet filters may
block material that is harmful to minors, they also block library patrons'
access to an enormous amount of constitutionally protected speech.' The
1. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
2. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412 (E.D. Pa.
2002).
3. See infra notes 136-157 and accompanying text (providing examples of several
legitimate Web sites blocked by Internet filters).
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outcome of the ALA case was a victory for members of Congress in fa-
vor of protecting children from potentially harmful material at all costs.
The road traveled by those members in favor of Internet regulation, how-
ever, has not been a smooth one.
In 1997 the Supreme Court struck down the Communications De-
cency Act (CDA), Congress' first statute enacted to regulate Internet
pornography. In 1998, Congress made a second attempt with the Child
Online Protection Act (COPA).' The Supreme Court reversed both lower
courts' decisions in the COPA case, finding that the statute was constitu-
tional, but remanded the case back to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
to examine the issues.6 The Third Circuit essentially reversed the Su-
preme Court's decision and found that COPA was indeed
unconstitutional.7 Apparently unsatisfied with the Third Circuit's reason-
ing, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari in the COPA case.' The
second time the Court followed the Third Circuit's reasoning, and held
that the lower court was probably correct in finding that COPA violates
the First Amendment.9 But the Supreme Court refused to end the COPA
saga, and remanded the case once again to the lower court to give the
government an opportunity to prove the law is constitutional.' While the
courts were tied up with COPA, Congress enacted CIPA to protect chil-
dren from accessing harmful material in libraries."
In 2000, public libraries, library associations, library patrons, and
Web site publishers challenged the constitutionality of CIPA alleging
that the statute's filtering requirements violated the 
First Amendment.' 2
The district court found for the plaintiff libraries and held that CIPA was
unconstitutional because 1) filters would impose viewpoint-based re-
strictions on speech in public fora, and 2) filtering software was not
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
3 The Su-
preme Court reversed the district court's decision, holding that CIPA did
not violate library patrons' First Amendment rights because libraries are
not public fora.' 4 The Court also held that the government is entitled
4. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997).
5. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 567-69 (2002) (noting that the Communica-
tions Decency Act was Congress' first attempt to regulate Internet pornography).
6. See id. at 1713-14.
7. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 268 (2003).
8. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 540 U.S. 944 (2003).
9. See Bill Mears, High Court Bars Internet Porn Law Enforcement, CNN Washington
Bureau, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/29/scotus.web.indecency/index.html (June 29,
2004) (last visited June 30, 2004).
10. See id.
11. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
12. Id. at 401.
13. See id. at 453, 479.
14. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205-06 (2003).
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"broad limits" when attaching conditions to the receipt of federal funds,
and that installing filtering software did not constitute an unconstitu-
tional condition.'5 The ALA Court, however, incorrectly decided the
CIPA case. First, the Court overlooked its well-settled First Amendment
jurisprudence regarding libraries. Moreover, it failed to properly apply
the public forum analysis and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Finally, the Court refused to apply the proper standard of statutory re-
view: strict scrutiny.
This Note will examine the constitutional issues raised by installing
Internet filtering software in public libraries. Part I explores the First
Amendment, the standard of review for restricting Internet material, and
the government's role in protecting minors and regulating speech. Part II
discusses library patrons' First Amendment rights in public libraries. Part
III provides the statutory framework of the E-rate and LSTA programs,
as well as the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA). Part IV exam-
ines the effectiveness of current Internet filtering technology and
provides the American Library Association's policies on Internet filter-
ing in public libraries. Part V discusses the district court's and the
Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. American Library Asso-
ciations, Inc. Finally, Part VI analyzes how the Supreme Court erred in
failing to hold CIPA unconstitutional.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."'6 The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the amendment is relevant in the discussion of
Internet filters in libraries. While the Court has held that the right to
speak and receive speech is protected, 7 it has also held that the First
Amendment does not afford protection to speech relating to violence,
libel, fighting words, and obscenity." In addition, the Court has ruled
15. See id. at 211.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stating the First Amendment
includes "the right to receive information and ideas"); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943) (explaining "The right of freedom of speech and press ... embraces the right to dis-
tribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it." (citations omitted)).
18. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (applying a three-prong test to
determine what constitutes obscenity). The prongs established by Miller are as follows:
a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
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that content-based restrictions on constitutionally protected speech are
subject to the standard of strict scrutiny.'9 Applying that standard, courts
will strike down regulations that are overbroad 2° or vague,2' or not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.12 Questions
arise, however, on whether these standards are manageable when applied
to new technology.
B. The Standard of Review Applied to Internet Content
The Internet is rapidly expanding23 and it is distinguishable from tra-
ditional sources of media, such as broadcast or print materials.24 The
Supreme Court has rejected attempts to link Internet and broadcast
sources, reasoning that radio and television are more "invasive" than the
World Wide Web.25 Broadcast material can find listeners and viewers
who were not looking for it, and the Supreme Court has held that in-
creased government regulation is justified to protect children from
indecent speech via radio and television.26 While the Court did not articu-
late a specific standard of review for government regulations regarding
broadcast material, it is clear that strict scrutiny does 
not apply.2 7
b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by applicable state law; and
c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Id.
19. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (holding content-based
restrictions on speech are subject to the most exacting scrutiny); Sable Communications of
Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (stating that government regulations on constitu-
tionally protected speech must be tailored using the least restrictive means to achieve a
compelling government interest).
20. See, e.g., Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). "It is
well established that in the area of freedom of expression an overbroad regulation may be
subject to facial review and invalidation, even though its application in the case under consid-
eration may be constitutionally unobjectionable." Id. at 129.
21. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). "[S]tandards of permissible
statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression?' Id. at 432.
22. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997) (holding that the Communications
Decency Act was unconstitutional because the government's defenses to the burden the Act
placed on protected speech did not constitute narrow tailoring).
23. See infra note 161 and accompanying text (stating the number of Web pages on the
Internet and the amount added daily).
24. See Kurt Wimmer & Victoria Carter, Let the Internet Industry Regulate Itself, 149
N.J.L.J. 460 (1997).
25. See id.: see also Reno. 521 U.S. at 869.
26. See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,749 (1978).
27. See id. at 748 ("[A] broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the
Commission decides that such an action would serve 'the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.' ").
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Unlike invasive broadcasting, viewers of print media make an af-
firmative choice when they select printed materials."' Since viewers of
print media can easily avoid undesirable content by choosing not to se-
lect it, government regulation is subject to strict scrutiny.29 Print
materials differ from the Internet in that a newspaper reader has "a set
path of how to proceed in a self-contained package., 30 However, an
Internet user affirmatively enters a Web address into a search engine or
selects a link, which is analogous to browsing a newspaper.' Ultimately,
the Internet falls into the same category as print media in the constitu-
tional arena3 2 and therefore Internet regulation must be based on a
compelling government interest and be achieved through the least re-
strictive means.
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 19963 was the first at-
tempt by Congress to regulate Internet content.34 In ACLU v. Reno,3 the
plaintiffs alleged that two provisions of the CDA violated their First
Amendment rights and their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.36 Spe-
cifically, the challenged provisions of the CDA prohibited any person
from knowingly transmitting obscene or indecent messages or displaying
patently offensive communication on the Internet to children under
eighteen years of age.37 The Supreme Court struck down these provisions
of the CDA as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, because the
terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" covered "large amounts of
nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value., 38 The
plaintiffs in that case argued that parental control was a better option,
suggesting that indecent material could be marked and parents could
decide what type of content could enter their homes.39 Using this ap-
proach, children would not be deprived of material containing artistic or
educational value, such as nude art.
28. See Wimmer & Carter, supra note 24.
29. See id. ("When the audience can easily avoid undesired content on that medium,
censorship is an inappropriate and constitutionally invalid approach to protecting sensitive
citizens, including children.").
30. April Mara Major, Internet Red Light Districts: A Domain Name Proposal for
Regulatory Zoning of Obscene Content, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L., 21, 24-25
(1997).
31. See Wimmer & Carter, supra note 24.
32. See id.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996).
34. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 567 (2002).
35. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
36. See id. at 849.
37. See id. at 827.
38. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997).
39. See id. at 879.
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The Child Online Protection Act (COPA)4° of 1998 was Congress'
second attempt to regulate Internet content.' COPA established a three-
part test ' to determine whether commercially published pornography on
the Internet was "harmful to minors." '3 In American Civil Liberties Un-
ion v. Reno," the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found that COPA infringed the First Amendment rights of
adults and issued a preliminary injunction.4 ' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The Supreme Court found that the type of content restricted
by COPA, unlike that restricted by the CDA, was narrowly defined, and
that using "contemporary community standards" to determine what ma-
terial was harmful to minors did not make the statute unconstitutional.46
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, stated that the Court's holding
was limited only to the issue of community standards. 47 The Court kept
the injunction in place and remanded the case to the Third Circuit to ex-
48amine the issues.
The Third Circuit essentially rejected the Supreme Court's reason-
ing, holding that COPA infringed on the rights of adults and was not
narrowly tailored to protect minors. 9 Specifically, the court found that
the term "minor" in the COPA statute included any person under the age
of seventeen, 0 and reasoned that the definition of the term minor was
40. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998).
41. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 567-69 (2002) (noting that the Communica-
tions Decency Act was Congress' first attempt).
42. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 246 (2003) (listing the three-part test applied to
Internet material, all of which must be satisfied to determine whether the material is "harmful
to minors"). COPA established the following test:
(a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find,
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to ap-
peal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(b) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to
minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simu-
lated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; and




44. 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (1999).
45. See id. at 498 (holding that the rights of minors cannot be protected "at the expense
of stifling the rights embodied in the Constitution.").
46. See id. at 1703.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 1714.
49. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 268 (2003)
50. Id. at 268.
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overbroad because material that would be appropriate for a sixteen-year
old would not be appropriate for a ten-year old child.' The court stated
"[b]ecause COPA's definition of 'minor' therefore broadens the reach of
'material that is harmful to minors' under the statute to encompass a vast
array of speech that is clearly protected for adults-and indeed, may not
be obscene as to older minors-the definition renders COPA signifi-
cantly overinclusive."52  Additionally, the court held that using
contemporary community standards to determine what type of Internet
material is harmful to minors would restrict the range of appropriate ma-
terial under COPA to the standards of the most "puritanical
communities." 3 The court kept the preliminary injunction in place and
the Supreme Court again granted certiorari 4 The second time the Court
reviewed the case it followed the lower court's reasoning.5 Justice Ken-
nedy, writing for the 5-to-4 majority, stated that COPA probably violates
the First Amendment. 6 He explained that if the law was upheld, "[t]here
[would be] a potential for extraordinary harm and a serious chill upon
protected speech." 7 But the Court did not lay the statute to rest; rather, it
remanded the case back to the lower court to give the government an-
other opportunity to prove the constitutionality of the law. 8
C. Protection of Minors and the Regulation of Speech
Children are protected by the Constitution, but a child's constitu-
tional rights are not equal to the constitutional rights of an adult. 9 The
Supreme Court has articulated three reasons why children are entitled to
lesser protection of their Constitutional rights: "the peculiar vulnerability
of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, ma-
ture manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing."
6
Also, while the Court has held that States have the power to limit chil-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 252.
54. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 540 U.S. 944 (2003).
55. See Bill Mears, High Court Bars Internet Porn Law Enforcement, CNN
Washington Bureau, June 29, 2004, available at http:llwww.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/291
scotus.web.indecency/index.html.
56. See id.
57. Ascroft v. ACLU, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2794 (2004).
58. See id.
59. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979).
60. Id. at 634.
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dren's constitutional rights,6 ' the Court has rejected state regulations
aimed at protecting minors that also suppress adult speech.62
States have the constitutional power to regulate children's access to
sexually explicit material.63 In Ginsberg v. New York, 64 the appellant was
charged with selling "girlie" magazines to a sixteen year-old boy.65 The
magazines at issue in the case were constitutionally protected for adults
because they were not considered obscene.6 Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, concluded that minors have lesser First Amendment rights
than adults . He considered the magazines unprotected for minors, and
thus the Brennan Court held that the government does not have to show a
compelling need to restrict minors' access to sexually explicit material.68
Rather, since the State's interest was in the development of the youth, a
rational-basis standard was sufficient. 9
The States have the power to limit children's First Amendment
rights, but this power is not limited to them; the federal government can
restrict minors' rights as well. Ten years after Ginsberg, the Supreme
Court decided Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Founda-
tion.70 The issue in this case was whether the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) could regulate the time of day that indecent, but not
obscene, radio broadcasts could be aired.7 The Court ruled that the FCC
could regulate the time of day because radio broadcasts are accessible to
minors and that indecent broadcasts could enter the home by surprise.72
The Court in its later holdings, however, has construed Pacifica nar-
rowly; it applies only to communications not completely banned by the
regulation in place, and also to communications that could enter the
home without warning.73
In 1989 the Supreme Court distinguished Pacifica in Sable Commu-
• • 74
nications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.
61. Id. at 635 (stating that "[T]he States validly may limit the freedom of children to
choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious
consequences.").
62. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
63. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
64. 390 U.S. at 629.
65. Id. at 631.
66. See id. at 634-35.
67. See id. at 636-37.
68. See id. at 641 (stating that the State has to only "rationally conclude" that materials
are harmful to minors).
69. See id.
70. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
71. See id. at 729-30.
72. See id. at 748-49.
73. See Sable Communications of Cal., 492 U.S. at 127-28.
74. See id. at 127.
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In Sable, the Court had to determine whether "dial-a-porn" messages
violated the Communications Act of 1934, which imposed a ban on all
indecent and obscene commercial telephone calls.75 The Court held that
the ban on obscene messages was constitutional, while the ban on inde-
cent messages violated the First Amendment.76 The Court recognized
that protecting the well being of children constituted a compelling gov-
ernment interest, but also determined that the compelling interest did not
justify a total ban on all of the messages." The Court distinguished this
case from Pacifica for two reasons: 1) the ban in Sable was a total ban,
in Pacifica it was not, and 2) dialing a telephone differs from listening to
a radio in that dialing a phone number requires an affirmative act, while
a radio broadcast could intrude upon a listener without warning. 78 The
Supreme Court's jurisprudence has laid the framework for balancing the
State's interest in protecting minors from harmful material and adults'
constitutional rights, holding that the State may not "reduce the adult
population... to reading only what is fit for children. 79
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LIBRARIES
A. Board of Education v. Pico
First Amendment protection includes the "right to receive informa-
tion and ideas."' Even though libraries are not legally required to obtain
certain books for circulation, First Amendment concerns do arise when a
library deliberately removes books from its collection.8' In Board of
Education v. Pico, a public school board removed books82 from the
school library that it labeled as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-
Semitic, and just plain filthy."83 The school board reasoned that it had a
duty to protect the students from the "moral danger" posed by the
75. See id. at 117-18.
76. See id. at 126.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 127-28.
79. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
affirmed the Butler holding. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002);
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000).
80. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
81. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (holding that the First Amend-
ment bars a library from removing books based on political or religious motive).
82. The books removed from the high school library were: Slaughter House Five, by
Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets, by Piri
Thomas; Best Short Stories of Negro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice, of
anonymous authorship; Laughing Boy, by Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy, by Richard Wright; A
Hero Ain't Nothin'But A Sandwich, by Alice Childress; and Soul on Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver.
Id. at 857 n.3.
83. Id. at 857.
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booksY. A group of students filed a suit alleging that the books' removalviolted heirFirt Amndmet " 85
violated their First Amendment rights. The students requested that the
nine removed books be returned and that the school board refrain from
removing any more books.86
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, explained that the constitu-
tional rights of students may be violated by removing books from a
school library because the First Amendment grants "public access to dis-
cussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas."
87
Justice Brennan stated that the First Amendment guarantees the right to
free speech and press, and that the right to receive information is inher-
ent in these rights for two reasons.88 First, because the right to free
speech and press allow an individual the freedom to distribute literature,
it follows that the individual also has the right to receive it.89 He further
reasoned that the distribution of ideas is moot if individuals are unable to
receive them.90 The plurality ruled that the school board could not re-
move books from the school library simply because they did not agree
with the ideas in the books.9' The Court remanded the case to determine
if in fact the motive of the school was to "prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion. 92
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Pico, stated that the government's
role in education is to instill knowledge and social values in young peo-
ple.93 Accordingly, schools are justified in making decisions based on
personal moral, social, and political views.9' Justice Rehnquist further
reasoned that school libraries supplement the government's teaching role
in elementary and secondary schools.9 He explained that "[u]nlike uni-
versity or public libraries, elementary and secondary school libraries are
not designed for freewheeling inquiry; they are tailored, as public school
curriculum is tailored, to the teaching of basic skills and ideas."96 He also
stated that if the books were easily available at another location, then the
84. Id.
85. Id. at 859.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 866; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (recognizing
"the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum
of available knowledge.").
88. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
89. Id. (citing Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
90. Pico, 457 U.S. at 853 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308
(1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
91. Pico, 457 U.S. at 872.
92. See Id. (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
93. Pico, 457 U.S. at 909 (Rehnquist, Burger, & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 915 (Rehnquist, Burger, & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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benefit that could be gained by the students was not restricted by the
government's action.97 Justice Rehnquist noted that the books removed
from the school library were readily available at a public library.9
B. Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees
of Loudoun County Library
Sixteen years after the Supreme Court decided Pico, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia handed down the
first major ruling on the merits regarding the use of Internet filtering
software in public libraries. In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees
of Loudoun County Library,99 Judge Brinkema found that public libraries
constitute limited public fora, °o and therefore, any content-based restric-
tion is subject to strict scrutiny.' °' The court concluded that even if
reducing access to illegal pornography and avoiding sexually hostile en-
vironments constituted compelling government interests, the filtering
policy adopted by the library was neither reasonably necessary'0 2 to fur-
ther a compelling governmental interest nor narrowly tailored to achieve
those interests.' 3 Judge Brinkema cited several less restrictive alterna-
tives: changing the location of Internet terminals, installing privacy
screens, and implementing an acceptable use policy.'04 The court rejected
the library's argument that filtering Internet content was analogous to the
library's decisions in determining what types of books to acquire.,°5
Rather, the court relied on Pico and held that Internet filtering consti-
tuted removal of the material and was therefore subject to strict
scrutiny. '06
97. See id. at 913 (Rehnquist, Burger, & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
98. See id. (Rehnquist, Burger, & Powell, JJ., dissenting). "Students are not denied
books by their removal from a school library. The books may be borrowed from a public li-
brary, read at a university library, purchased at a bookstore, or loaned by a friend." Id. at 915.
99. 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
100. See id. at 563.
101. See id. at 562-63. Content-based restrictions must be "narrowly drawn to effectuate
a compelling state interest." Id. at 562 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
102. Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 565-66. The evidence showed that only
one person complained about a minor viewing pornography in a public Virginia library, and
the court reasoned that such an isolated incident could not prove the filtering policy was nec-
essary. See id.
103. Id. at 566-67.
104. Id. at 566.
105. Id. at 561.
106. See id.
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III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The E-rate Program
In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress instructed the
Federal Communications Commission to develop a plan that would pro-
vide affordable telecommunications service to all Americans'0 7 Congress
determined that schools and libraries would be beneficiaries of the plan,
and this portion of the plan is commonly referred to as the "E-rate" pro-
108
gram.
Under the E-rate program "[a]ll telecommunications carriers serving
a geographic area shall, upon a bona fide request for any of its services
that are within the definition of universal service ... provide such ser-
vices to elementary schools, secondary schools, and libraries for
educational purposes at rates less than the amounts charged for similar
services to other parties. ' 9 A library must meet three requirements to be
eligible for the discounts."0 The library must be an independent entity,
function as a not-for-profit business, and be eligible for the assistance
under the Library Services and Technology Act."'
B. Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA)
Congress enacted the LSTA in 1996 as part of the Omnibus Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act of 1997, with the goal of improving library
services nationwide."2 To achieve this, LSTA put together the Grants to
States Program." 3 Under this program, libraries are awarded funds to pay
for costs involved in computer systems, accessing information electroni-
cally, and telecommunications technologies."4 Through this program
libraries have used LSTA funds to provide Internet services to their pa-
trons."
Given this Congressional action to provide funding to enhance li-
brary use of technology and specifically the Internet, it was only a matter
of time before Congress established additional requirements for the re-
ceipt of the federal funds. Congress set forth these requirements in the
Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA)," 6 which amended the E-rate
107. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 411 (E.D. Pa 2002).
108. Id.
109. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B)(2001).




114. See 20 U.S.C. § 9141(a)(2000).
115. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 412.
116. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1701, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-335 (2000).
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and LSTA programs,"17 and provided that recipients of E-rate and LSTA
funds must install Internet filters on all computers, or forfeit the funds."
8
C. The Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA)
CIPA applies to two types of federal funding directly related to li-
braries: first, it applies to LSTA grants, and second, it applies to
discounts associated with the E-rate program."9 Under CIPA, libraries
are required to purchase and install software filters on their computers in
order to participate in LSTA or E-rate funding programs.120 CIPA re-
quires Internet filters that block images that constitute obscenity or child
pornography, and prevent minors from obtaining access to material that
is harmful to them.12 ' Material harmful to minors is a picture, image,
graphic, file or other visual illustration that (1) "taken as a whole and
with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient interest in nudity, sex or
excretion," or that (2) "depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently
offensive way with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or
simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals," and
(3) "taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value as to minors.'
' 22
CIPA expressly prohibits federal interpretation of what content is
suitable for minors and instead defers judgment to the local communi-
ties. 23 Library officials are permitted to disable the filters for all patrons
for "bona fide research or other lawful purposes" under the LSTA pro-




A. How Filters Work
Internet filters block speech by using one or more of the following
methods: blacklists, allow lists, keyword blocking, image blocking, and
117. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F Supp. 2d at 412-13.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 412.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 413.
122. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G)(i)-(iii) (2000).
123. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(1)(2) ("A determination regarding what matter is appropriate
for minors shall be made by the school board, local educational agency, library or other au-
thority responsible for making the determination.").
124. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (2000). See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539
U.S. 194, 201 (2003).
To Surf and Protect
protocol blocking."' Blacklists block access to any prohibited Web ad-
dress contained in a predetermined database. 26 Filter companies design
their filters to allow users to designate categories such as "nudity" and
"profanity," and prohibited addresses are then deposited in these catego-
ries.2 7 Allow lists operate in a similar way except that they depend on a
pre-approved list of Web sites.12' Keyword blocking software blocks any
Internet sites that include words contained in a list of prohibited 
words. 2 9
Image blocking software works in the same way as keyword blocking,
except that it uses more advanced technology to block any pornographic
images detected.30 Filters used to block entire categories, also called
protocol filters,"s' are used to deny a user access to an entire domain or to
a large portion of the Internet.32 This type of software is commonly used
to block chat rooms, games, newsgroups containing graphic images, and
to restrict library patrons from using e-mail.1
3
B. The Ineffectiveness of Internet Filters
While it is impossible for any of these filtering methods to exclude
all targeted material and no other, many commercial Internet filters block
a substantial amount of appropriate and constitutionally protected
speech.34 The Free Expression Policy Project's policy report on Internet
filters found a substantial amount of appropriate, constitutionally pro-
tected speech blocked by commercial Internet filters including:
The "University of Kansas's Archie R. Dykes Medical
Library (upon detecting the word 'dykes')"
125. Junichi P. Semitsu, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filtering
Software vs. The First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REv. 509, 513 (2000).
126. See id.
127. See Jeannette Allis Bastian, Filtering the Internet in American Public Libraries:
Sliding Down the Slippery Slope, 2 FIRST MONDAY 10, 16, at http://www.firstmonday.dk/
issues/issue2_10/bastian/ (last visited June 30, 2004) (stating that CyberPatrol, a popular
Internet filter, blocks twelve categories including profanity, violence, sexual acts, etc.).
128. Semitsu, supra note 125, at 513.
129. See id. at 514.
130. See Anti-Pornography Software Breakthrough-Launch of Pornography Blocking
Software, M2 Presswire, Mar. 25, 1997, available at 1997 WL 8032313 (explaining that Im-
ageCensor scans for pornographic images and then allows the user, upon detection, to lock out
the program or capture it and store it).
131. Bastian, supra note 127, at 15.
132. Semitsu, supra note 125, at 514.
133. Id.
134. See Marjorie Heins & Christina Cho, Free Expression Policy Project, Internet Fil-
ters: A Public Policy Report, at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/filteringreport.htmi
(analyzing over seventy studies and tests) (last visitied June 30, 2004) [hereinafter Free Ex-
pression]; see also MAJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: "INDECENCY,"
CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 181-200 (2001).
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• "'Let's Have an Affair' catering company"
• "Marijuana: Facts for Teens (a brochure published by the Na-
tional Institute on Drug Abuse)"
• "House Majority Leader Richard 'Dick' Armey's official Web
site"
" "Georgia O'Keeffe and Vincent Van Gogh sites."'13
Keyword blocking software is responsible for most of the over-
blocking described above since any Web site, sentence,
phrase, or word containing the prohibited word will be
blocked.
The word "breast" was banned from some areas of America Online's
(AOL) service and breast cancer survivors were prohibited from entering
AOL's bulletin boards. 3 6 CyberPatrol, a popular filtering software prod-
uct among schools and public libraries, blocked access to Web sites
containing material on the poet Anne Sexton because her name contains
the word "sex."' 37 While it is clear that keyword blocking is ineffective in
filtering out potentially inappropriate material and still retaining appro-
priate, educational material, 38 this method of filtering is still in use.
Yahooligans! is a "Web guide for kids" provided by the popular search
engine Yahoo!. 139 Searches by the author in Yahooligans! for "Dick's
Sporting Goods," and "Anne Sexton," yielded the same result: Sorry, no
results were found. A similar search performed using Yahoo!'s unre-
stricted search function provided over 100,000 hits for each of the above
mentioned search strings. Without a doubt, keyword-based filtering
technology is alive and well.
While it is understandable, at least mechanically, that filters using
keyword blocking would prohibit access to "Sexton" Web sites, it is per-
plexing that filters block some information with no explanation
whatsoever. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) found
that useful and appropriate material for children was blocked by Internet
filtering software, and the researchers conducting the study were unable
135. See Free Expression, supra note 134.
136. See Semitsu, supra note 125, at 514.
137. See Bastian, supra note 127, at 16; Online Policy Group, Harmful to Minors Re-
view, at http://www.onlinepolicy.org/access/harmfultominorsreview.shtml (last visited June
30, 2004).
138. See Free Expression, supra note 134.
139. See <yahooligans.yahoo.com>.
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to explain why such material was blocked.' ° EPIC conducted searches
using a Web-based search engine called Net Shepard Family Search
(Family Search) to determine the impact Internet filters had on informa-
tion on the Internet. ' The EPIC researchers submitted a search request
and that request would be directed to a search engine called AltaVista. 1
4
AltaVista's results are then filtered by the Family Search ratings data-
base, and the user is presented with the filtered results.4
An Internet user could search for "The National Aquarium in Balti-
more" using AltaVista and receive 2,134 results.'" The same search,
using Family Search produced only 63 results.'45 The researchers at EPIC
decided to view the first 200 pages returned from AltaVista, looking for
any content or material that would cause Family Search to exclude these
results.' 46 EPIC researchers found that the pages included speeches and
papers about the aquarium, information about aquariums located outside
the United States, and information about events held at the aquarium."'
EPIC received similar results from searches containing the terms "Tho-
mas Edison," "The United States Supreme Court," and the "National
Basketball Association.'4 8 While there is no concrete explanation for
these results, it is clear that Internet filters erroneously block a substan-
tial amount of appropriate material.
Most of the criticism regarding filters is due to the fact that filters are
over-inclusive; they block sites beyond the scope intended by their crea-
tors. 49 A filtering company may, however, block sites that offend its
political and moral agenda. " One popular Internet filter, Cybersitter,
blocks the Web sites of the National Organization for Women (NOW)
and Peacefire,'5' as well as nonpornographic gay themed material such as
140. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Faulty Filters: How Content Filters
Block Access to Kid-Friendly Information on the Internet, at http://www2.epic.org/reports/






146. See id. (rationalizing that because Family Search returned only 63 results, the next
137 may contain material harmful to minors).
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Free Expression, supra note 134 (showing that Internet filters designed to block
content harmful to minors also block Web sites with educational value).
150. See Marjorie Heins, On Protecting Children From Censorship: A Reply to Amitai
Etzioni, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 229, 235 (2004) (stating that subjective judgments by company
employees "are driven by the political and moral views of the company owners.").
151. Peacefire is an anti-censorship youth organization that frequently reports on the
inaccuracies of Internet filters. www.peacefire.org. See Elizabeth Wasserman, On-Line Smut
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alt.politics.homosexualnewsgroup'5 Another filter, NetNanny, blocks
government Web sites such as the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
filter SurfWatch blocks Reuters articles about HIV and AIDS.'53 Cyber-
Patrol's software blocks the Queer Resources Directory and the M.I.T.
Free-Speech Society.'54 Software companies usually choose to block sites
containing material such as pornography, hate crimes, violence and pro-
fanity.'55 What is unusual about the blocked sites listed above is that they
do not contain material objectionable by a software company's typical
criteria.
Over-inclusiveness is not the only fatal flaw present in filters; studies
have shown that some filters are also under-inclusive. The Censorware
Project conducted a test of the filter Bess and concluded that thousands
of pornographic sites were granted access with the filter in place. 56 Op-
ponents of filters argue that the reason for under-inclusiveness is because
of the size and rate of growth of the Internet.5 7 The World Wide Web
currently contains over two billion pages and is adding pages at a rate of
two million per day.5 8 If a filtering company's employees could read an
entire Web page in thirty seconds, the company would have to employ
750 people to read all of the new information being added to the Inter-
net.5 9 That is assuming, of course, the employees are working twenty-
four hours a day and seven days a week.' 6 N2H2, the company that
makes the filtering software Bess, employs fifteen full-time and fifty-
eight part-time employees to review Web pages. 6' It is obvious that such
a small workforce would be hard-pressed to view all pages even a single
time, but taking into account the fact that Web pages are constantly
changing, N2H2's employees first read through will be quickly outdated.
Given the vast amount of information proving the inaccuracies of Inter-
Filters Are Not Infallible, THE RECORD (Northern New Jersey), Jan. 5, 1998, at H9, available
at 1998 WL 5790655 (last visited June 30, 2004).
152. See Free Expression, supra note 134.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See Semitsu, supra note 125, at 513 (stating Web sites "[U]sually [sort Internet
content] into categories such as "full nudity" and "profanity.").
156. See The Censorware Project, Passing Porn, Banning the Bible: N2H2's Bess in
Public Schools, at http://censorware.net/reports/bess/ (last visited June 30, 2004) [hereinafter
Censorware].
157. See id.
158. See Heins, supra note 150, at 234.
159. See Censorware, supra note 156.
160. See id.
161. Id. (basing these facts on the company's recent [PO filing).
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net filters, it is not surprising that the American Library Association
adamantly opposes the use of filters in public libraries. 62
C. What the Libraries Want
The American Library Association (ALA) believes that intellectual
freedom can exist only if the public has unrestricted access to materials
and information, regardless of content.' 63 Therefore, the ALA does not
believe the libraries' role is to be a gatekeeper of information. To the
contrary, public libraries have distinguished themselves from schools in
that they do not stand in loco parentis.' 6 The ALA supports the idea that
public libraries encourage the dissemination of information to all pa-
trons. Additionally, the ALA's Library Bill of Rights'
66 explicitly states
that no library shall deny an individual access to information on the basis
of age. 67 With the popularity of the Internet continually increasing, theALA has directly addressed the libraries' role in regulating patrons'
162. See American Library Associations, Resolution on the Use of Filtering Software in
Libraries, at http:/ala.orglalaorg/oif/filt-res.html (last visited June 30, 2004) [hereinafter
Resolution].
163. See OFFICE FOR INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM OF THE AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, INTELLEC-
TUAL FREEDOM MANUAL (5th ed. 1996) (noting that intellectual freedom is achieved when
society agrees to the right to unrestricted access of information regardless of the content of the
work or the viewpoints of the author and the receiver).
164. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (discussing
schools standing in loco parentis).
165. See American Library Association, Library Bill of Rights, at http://www.ala.org/
ala/oif/statementspols/statementsifs/librarybillrights.htm (last visited June 30, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter ALA Bill of Rights].
166. Id. The American Library Association Bill of Rights provides:
I. Books and other library resources should be provided for the interests, infor-
mation, and enlightenment of all people of the community the library serves.
Materials should not be excluded because of the origin, background, or views
of those contributing to their creation.
II. Libraries should provide materials and information presenting all points of
views of view on current and historical issues. Materials should not be pro-
scribed or removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval.
III. Libraries should challenge censorship in the fulfillment of their responsibility
to provide information and enlightenment.
IV. Libraries should cooperate with all persons and groups concerned with resist-
ing abridgement of free expression and free access to ideas.
V. A person's right to use a library should not be denied or abridged because of
origin, age, background, or views.
VI. Libraries which make exhibit spaces and meeting rooms available to the pub-
lic they serve should make such facilities available on an equitable basis,
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Internet access. 16 The ALA has stated that individuals' Internet access
should not be restricted based upon their age or based upon the content
of the information.' 69 The ALA further states that it is the patron's re-
sponsibility to decide what material is appropriate for viewing and that
parents must determine what material is suitable for their children.'
70
In 1997, the ALA addressed the issue of filtering software on library
computers. 7' The ALA stated that libraries that decided to implement
filtering software in an attempt to prevent patrons from viewing inappro-
priate content online violated the Library Bill of Rights, and that
blocking constitutionally protected speech could subject the libraries to
legal liability.' 72 Based on the ALA's stated position and its Library Bill
of Rights, installing filtering software on library computers is totally in-
consistent with the ALA's mission. For this reason, the ALA filed a
lawsuit against the United States alleging that CIPA is unconstitutional.
V. UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, INC.
A. The District Court
Shortly after President Clinton signed CIPA in 2000, a group of pub-
lic libraries, library associations, library patrons, and Web site publishers
sued the United States, alleging that CIPA's filtering requirements vio-
lated the First Amendment.' A three-judge district court heard the case
and ruled after a trial that CIPA was facially unconstitutional. 74 The
court held that any public library that complies with CIPA's conditions
will necessarily violate the First Amendment by imposing viewpoint-
based restrictions on speech in a public forum. '
The district court distinguished decisions about Internet material
from decisions regarding print material. 76 The court noted that in gen-
eral, libraries' decisions regarding which print materials to acquire are
subject to rational basis review. 177 The court stated the key difference was
that "by providing patrons with even filtered Internet access, the library
168. See Resolution, supra note 162.
169. See ALA Bill of Rights, supra note 165; Resolution, supra note 162.
170. See American Library Association, Access to Electronic Information, Services, and
Networks: An Interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights, at http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/
electacc.html (last visited June 30, 2004).
171. See Resolution, supra note 162.
172. See id.
173. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,407 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
174. Id. at 490.
175. Id. at 453.
176. Id. at 462.
177. See id.
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permits patrons to receive speech on a virtually unlimited number of top-
ics, from a virtually unlimited number of speakers, without attempting to
restrict patrons' access to speech that the library, in the exercise of its
professional judgment, determines to be particularly valuable."'' The
court also found that public libraries constitute limited public fora.179 Ac-
cordingly, the court explained that content-based restrictions on speech
in a limited public forum trigger strict scrutiny.80 The court held that the
government has a compelling interest in preventing the dissemination of
illegal or harmful material to minors,' but the use of software filters is
not narrowly tailored to further that compelling interest.
82
B. The Supreme Court Plurality
The Supreme Court reversed. 83 Writing for the plurality, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated that Congress has broad discretion in attaching
conditions to the receipt of federal funds.' He also noted that Congress
may not impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds that would
require the recipient "to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional."'8" The plurality then considered the role of libraries in
modem society to determine whether filter requirements violate the First
Amendment.
86
Libraries, Rehnquist pointed out, strive to provide a vast amount of
information and acquire materials that will directly benefit the commu-
nity. 87 The Chief Justice further stated that universal access to all
materials has never been a goal of libraries; rather, they provide a wealth
of information tailored to meet the public's needs. 188 Justice Rehnquist
compared libraries to institutions involved in two prior cases in which
the Court held that the government had broad discretion to decide which
private speech to support and that public forum analysis, therefore, did189
not apply. Justice Rehnquist relied on the Court's decision in Arkansas
Ed. Television Commission v. Forbes,'9° a case in which the Supreme
Court held that "public forum principles do not generally apply to a
178. Id.
179. See id. at 457.
180. See id. at 460.
181. See id. at 471.
182. See id. at 479.
183. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003).
184. Id. at 203 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).
185. Id. (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 210).
186. Id.
187. See id. at 2303-04.
188. See id. at 2304.
189. See id.
190. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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public television station's editorial judgments regarding the private
speech it presents to its viewers," because "broad rights of access for
outside speakers would be antithetical ... to the discretion that stations
and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose
and statutory obligations."'' Similarly, he relied on Nat'l Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley,192 a case in which the Court held that an art-funding
program, that used content-based criteria, did not require forum analysis
because the quality of the work was ingrained in the nature of the pro-
gram.' 93 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that in the same way that forum
analysis does not apply to public television stations and art-funding pro-
grams, it also does not apply to the decisions public libraries make to
achieve their traditional goals.' 94 Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court's
reasoning in Forbes and Finley also applies to libraries because library
employees consider content and are entitled to broad discretion when
selecting material.'"
The district court's reliance on the public forum analysis, Justice• 96
Rehnquist stated, was incorrect. He reasoned that because Internet ac-
cess in public libraries is not a "traditional" public forum, forum analysis
was irrelevant in this case. 197 The Chief Justice defined a traditional pub-
lic forum as one that has "immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public and, time out of mind.., been used for purposes of assembly,
communication of thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."'198 In addition, he stated that the Court was unwilling to ex-
tend the traditional public forum doctrine to newer technology such as
Internet access because of its lack of history.99
The plurality also rejected the district court's conclusion that the
public forum doctrine applies because public libraries serve as a public
forum for Web publishers.20 Justice Rehnquist stated that since libraries
do not create public fora for the authors of books to speak, it follows that
it does not create fora for Web publishers to express themselves.' Ac-
cording to Rehnquist, Internet access and printed materials in a library
are there for the same purpose: to facilitate research and learning, and to
191. Id. at 673.
192. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).





198. Id. at 205 (citing International Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672, 679 (1992)).
199. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 205-06.
200. See id. at 206.
201. See id.
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provide a benefit for the community.20 2 The Internet is "no more than a
technological extension of the book stack., 20 3 Additionally, just as librar-
ies are permitted to determine what books they select for their collection,
they are equally entitled to choose the kind of material they collect from
the Internet.l The plurality reasoned that because of the vast amount of
information available on the Internet, libraries have two choices: first, a
library could limit its Internet collection to sites it finds worthwhile, or
second, a library could use filtering software to exclude certain con-
tent.05 The plurality concluded that the latter was the better option,
because the former could potentially exclude an enormous amount of
information.2°'
In addition to rejecting the public forum analysis, the plurality re-
jected the appellees' argument that CIPA's filtering requirement for
receipt of federal assistance is unconstitutional.2 7 The appellees argued
that filters restrict the libraries' First Amendment rights to provide pro-
tected speech to its patrons. 20 Their argument was based on the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which provides that Congress can-
not attach unconstitutional conditions to the receipt of federal funds."l
The government responded to this claim by arguing that libraries do not
have First Amendment rights because they are government entities."0
The plurality agreed only that "the government 'may not deny a benefit
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected...
freedom of speech, even if he has no entitlement to that benefit. 21 The
plurality declined to address the issue of whether libraries have First
Amendment rights, reasoning that if libraries did have such a claim, that
claim was without merit.212 Rather, Justice Rehnquist cited Rust v. Sulli-
van,21 3 and stated that the government is entitled "broad limits" when it
202. See id.
203. Id. (citing S.Rep. No. 106-141, at 7 (1999)).
204. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 538 U.S. at 207-08. Justice Rehnquist also stated that
"[m]ost libraries already exclude pornography from their print collections because they deem
it inappropriate for inclusion." Id at 208.
205. See id.
206. See id. Cf. Semitsu, supra note 125, at 542 (providing numerous alternatives to
Internet filters).
207. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 210-13.
208. See id.
209. See id. The government "[M]ay not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that in-
fringes his constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597 (1972).
210. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 210.
211. See id., citing Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Unibehr, 518 U.S. 668, 67 4
(1996) (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
212. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 211.
213. 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
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creates a program and determines how public funds are appropriated to
214that program.
The issue in Rust was whether the government could provide funds
for family planning services, but prohibit the use of these funds in pro-
grams that included abortion counseling."5 Recipients of the funds
argued that they had a constitutional right to abortion counseling and that
in order to receive funds they would have to forfeit their constitutional
right to participate in abortion counseling. '6 The Supreme Court rejected
that claim reasoning that the individual recipients were not being denied
a benefit but rather that the government was ensuring that public funds
be spent on the program for which they were intended."7 Justice
Rehnquist stated that the issue in this case was no different; 211 the funds
appropriated for the E-rate and LSTA programs were intended to assist
libraries in acquiring material that is educational and informational for
members of the community.2 '9 The plurality held that "Congress may
certainly insist that these 'public funds be spent for the purposes for
which they were authorized.' 20 The plurality further justified its reason-
ing by stating that because libraries have excluded pornographic material
from their other collections,221 Congress is entirely within its limits to
exclude funding for electronic versions of this material 2  Additionally,
Justice Rehnquist stated that libraries are certainly allowed to offer unfil-
tered Internet access, but if they do so, they will not receive federal
funding.223
The plurality's next hurdle was the issue of "overblocking," which
occurs when protected speech is erroneously blocked by the filtering
software.'2 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, notes that overblocking is
not a concern because a patron may have the filter disabled. 22 The Chief
Justice dismissed the District Court's view that a request to disable a fil-
214. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 211.
215. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178.
216. See id. at 196.
217. See id.
218. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 211.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 211-12 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196).
221. It is worth noting that most libraries include The Joy of Sex and The Joy of Gay Sex
which contain descriptions and explicit pictures. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., v. United States, 201
E Supp. 2d 401,406 (E.D Pa. 2002).
222. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 208-09. See also Free Expression, supra note 134 (listing hundreds of erro-
neously blocked Web pages).
225. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 208-09. "Assuming that such erroneous block-
ing presents constitutional difficulties, any such concerns are dispelled by the ease with which
patrons may have the filtering software disabled. When a patron encounters a blocked site, he
need only ask a librarian to unblock it or. .. disable the filter." Id. at 209.
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ter by a patron might be too embarrassing by stating, "the Constitution
does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a public library
without any risk of embarrassment.
' 226
The plurality's findings led them to several conclusions. First, filter-
ing software does not violate library patrons' First Amendment rights. 7
Second, CIPA is constitutional under Congress' Spending Powers. 8
Lastly, installing filtering software for receipt of federal funds is not an
unconstitutional condition. 9
C. The Concurrences
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the plurality, finding
that CIPA was constitutional on its face because libraries could unblock
filtered material at the request of a patron.30 Justice Kennedy did note,
however, that his decision was predominantly based on the idea that un-
blocking was a simple process, and that significant delay was not an
issue.2 1' Kennedy's confidence on this point was unjustified, however,
because the district court noted that unblocking could be a lengthy proc-
ess in branch libraries, which are typically understaffed.232 Justice
Kennedy stated that if the removal of the software was burdensome
CIPA would be subject to "as-applied" challenges. 233 Even though the
majority of Justice Kennedy's opinion focused on this aspect of the case,
he found the statute constitutional because the district court did not base
its decision on the difficulties involved in disabling the filters.23'
Justice Breyer concurred with the plurality, agreeing that the public
forum doctrine was inapplicable and that CIPA's statutory provisions
were constitutional. 23 He did, however, argue that CIPA should be held
to a higher standard of scrutiny because it restricted public access to in-
formation.236 Justice Breyer stated that the standard should have been
whether "the harm to speech-related interests is disproportionate in light
of both the justifications and the potential alternatives., 23 7 Using this test,
he agreed that CIPA was constitutional.238
226. Id. at 209.
227. Id. at 214.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
231. Id.
232. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
233. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 215-16 (Brcycr, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 216-17 (Breyer, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 217 (Breyer, J., concurring).
238. See id. at 218 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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D. The Dissenters
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that CIPA acts as a "blunt nation-
wide restraint on adult access to 'an enormous amount of valuable
information"' and that local communities should determine how to rem-
edy their local problems.139 He also reasoned that given the vast amount
of information available on the Internet, it would be impossible for li-
brarians to review all of the Internet sites and determine which sites are
appropriate for minors."0 Justice Stevens' dissent raised serious doubt
about the effectiveness of filtering software, and he argued that since
filters rely on keyword-based blocking they do not have the ability to
define specific categories.2 41 He explained that the software would not
recognize Web sites with sexually explicit pictures and that Web sites
using image files rather than text to represent words would render auto-
mated review impossible.242 The result would be "underblocking," which
would provide parents with a false sense of security.243 In addition, un-
derblocking will not prevent minors from being exposed to harmful
material, and CIPA will have failed to solve the problem that fueled its
enactment.' 4 Justice Stevens also explained that protecting children from
harmful material does not justify an overly broad restriction on adults'
rights to constitutionally protected speech. 245 Justice Stevens further ar-
gued that the libraries' ability to remove filters was not enough to make
CIPA constitutional. 246 He reasoned that since patrons cannot see what is
being blocked, they cannot know which sites to request.
247
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, also dissented, arguing
that filtering software in libraries is unconstitutional even without federal
compulsion.248 He was extremely skeptical of the idea that an adult pa-
tron could obtain access to blocked Web sites simply by asking a
librarian.2 9 Justice Souter referred to the statute's language, arguing that
CIPA only states that a librarian "may" remove or disable the filter, not
that a librarian is required to.250 He also questioned the statute's provision
239. Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. See id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. See id.
245. Id. "The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress
unlawful speech." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
246. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 224 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247. See id. (stating patrons cannot know what is being blocked until it is unblocked).
248. See id. at 231 (Souter & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting).
249. See id. at 232 (Souter & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting).
250. Id. at 233 (Souter & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting).
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regarding removal for "bona fide research or other lawful purpose. 25'
Justice Souter reasoned that the term "lawful purpose" was ambiguous,
and that there must be some restrictions that would prevent a librarian
from being the sole determiner.252
In his dissent, Justice Souter also argued that the statute could have
granted adults unrestricted Internet access, no questions asked. 253 He fur-
ther stated that blocking adults' access to material inappropriate for
children, which adults would lawfully be entitled to see, would be im-
posing content-based restrictions on material within the library's
control .2  That, he explained, would be censorship.ns Justice Souter was
careful to explain that censorship would not occur if adults were success-
ful in persuading a librarian that they were bona fide researchers using
the Internet for lawful purposes. 26 Adults, however, who could not con-
vince a librarian to remove or disable the filter would be victims of
complete censorship. 7
VI. HOW THE SUPREME COURT ERRED
In United States v. American Library Association, Inc., (ALA) the
Court failed to directly address whether CIPA violates the First Amend-
ment rights of library patrons.5 s Justice Rehnquist explicitly declined to
address the question of whether public entities may assert First Amend-
ment rights against the federal government.2 59 Rather, the Chief Justice,
writing for the plurality, upheld CIPA on the grounds that libraries do not
constitute public fora and that Congress has broad discretion to define
the limits of a program when the government spends public money on
that program.26° The plurality, however, overlooked the First Amendment
implications involved in CIPA, incorrectly applied the public forum
analysis and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and as a result
failed to invoke the proper standard of statutory review, strict scrutiny.
251. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (f)(3)(2003)).
252. See id. "[Clourts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language
superfluous." Connecticut Nat'l. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
253. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 234 (Souter & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting).




258. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 214-216 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 200, 214 and accompanying text.
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A. Library Patrons Have First Amendment Rights
The first obstacle encountered when challenging the validity of a
provision under the First Amendment is to determine whether a First
Amendment right exists.26' The Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment guarantees "the right to receive information and ideas. 262 In
Pico, the Court held that students' rights to receive information was vio-
lated when the school board removed certain books from the school
library simply because the board disliked the ideas contained in the
books.263 Justice Rehnquist should have adopted the Court's reasoning in
Pico, because filtering Internet content is tantamount to removing books.
When a public library buys Internet access, all Internet material is in-
stantly available to library patrons.26 It follows that the Internet is similar
to a set of encyclopedias,2 65 and CIPA's filtering requirement is analogous
to removing certain encyclopedias from the set because the filters will
block or essentially remove certain portions of the Internet. Indeed, plac-
ing filters on public library computers is in effect a removal decision.
Blocking Internet material by way of filtering violates library patrons'
rights to receive information and ideas and therefore violates their First
Amendment rights.
While the Court should have followed Pico, it is understandable that
Justice Rehnquist did not adopt Pico because he dissented in that case. 2 66
But his reasoning in his Pico dissent was based on the removal of books
in school libraries, not public libraries.267 Justice Rehnquist argued that
school libraries could remove certain books because "unlike university
or public libraries .... school libraries are not designed for freewheeling
inquiry. ' 26 He further stated that the removal was justified because the
denied ideas were easily and readily available at public libraries.269 By
this very reasoning, removing Internet material from public libraries by
way of filtering gives young people almost no other options to access
appropriate and controversial but not illegal information. The ALA Court
should have followed the Court's reasoning in Pico, and found that
261. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985);
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1250 (3rd Cir. 1992).
262. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
263. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.853, 872 (1982).
264. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 2 F.
Supp. 2d 783, 793 (E.D. Va. 1998).
265. See id. at 794.
266. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 904 (1982) (Rehnquist, Burger, & Powell,
JJ., dissenting).
267. See id. at 915 (Rehnquist, Burger, & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
268. See id. (emphasis added).
269. Id. at 913 (Rehnquist, Burger, & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
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CIPA's filtering requirement is a removal requirement that violates li-
brary patrons' First Amendment right to receive ideas.
The Court may have declined to address the First Amendment issue
because minors, the class CIPA is designed to protect, are afforded lesser
constitutional rights than adults. 270 And if filters blocked only material
harmful to minors, such as pornography, the Court may have been justi-
fied in limiting minors' rights through the use of Internet filtering.
Filters, however, block vast amounts of material containing educational
and artistic value,27' and therefore cannot be relied upon as a constitu-
tional means of limiting minors' First Amendment rights because they
block material that does not yield any potentially serious consequences.
Recognizing that library patrons have a First Amendment right to receive
Internet material is, however, only the first step; whether the government
regulation may limit patrons' access depends on what type of forum is at
272issue.
B. Public Libraries Are Limited Public Fora
The Supreme Court in Perry Educational Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Association, identified three categories of public fora for
the purposes of determining the amount of protection afforded to
speech.27" These categories are traditional fora, limited or designated
public fora, and non-public fora.275 Traditional public fora include
sidewalks and parks, and content-based exclusions in these fora are
subject to strict scrutiny.276 Limited or designated public fora are places
of "public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity" an example being a municipal theater.277 The
ALA district court held, "where the state designates a forum for expressive
activity and opens the forum for speech by the public at large on a wide
range of topics, strict scrutiny applies to restrictions that single out for
exclusion from the forum particular speech whose content is
disfavored. ' 278 Non-public fora are places such as federal or state office
buildings, and are subject to a very low standard of review.279 While
270. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 134-154 and accompanying text.
272. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3rd Cir.
1992).
273. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
274. See id. at 45-46.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 45.
277. Id.
278. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,461 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
279. See Perry Ed. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
Spring 2005]
466 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:437
libraries do not constitute traditional or non-public fora, federal courts
have held they do constitute limited public fora.280
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Kreimer
v. Bureau of Police,28' was the first court to determine that a public li-
brary was a limited public forum, and its decision was based on three
factors: government intent, extent of use, and the nature of the forum.
82
Six years later the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia decided Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of Loudoun
County Library,283 and following Kreimer and applying its three factors,
the court ruled that a public library in Virginia constituted a limited pub-
lic forum. 8
Both the Kreimer and Mainstream Loudoun courts found that the
"government intended" to open the libraries to the public as limited pub-
lic fora.285 In Kreimer, the court relied on a New Jersey Township's
statute governing the establishment of public libraries which encouraged
all patrons to use the library "to the maximum extent possible.2 86 The
Mainstream Loudoun court found that the public library in Virginia in-
tended to create a public forum when the Library Board of Trustees
declared in a resolution that its "primary objective ... [is] that people
have access to all avenues of ideas" and that the public interest requires
"offering the widest possible diversity of views and expressions." 7
The Kreimer and Mainstream Loudoun court also ruled that the ex-
tent of use granted by the New Jersey and Virginia state governments
was sufficient to find that both libraries constituted limited public fora.288
The Kreimer court based its reasoning on a state statute granting all resi-
dents of Morristown New Jersey access to the library and excluding
patrons only if they were found in violation of the library rules.2 9 The
Mainstream Loudon court found that the Virginia public library's policy
granting access to all persons regardless of "age, race, religion, origin,
background or views" was sufficient to show the library limited its own
280. See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1262 (3rd
Cir. 1992); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F
Supp. 2d 552, 563 (E.D. Va. 1998).
281. 958 E2d 1242.
282. Id. at 1259-62.
283. 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
284. Id. at 562-563.
285. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259; Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F Supp. 2d at 562-63.
286. See Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259.
287. Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63.
288. See Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260; Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F Supp. 2d at 563.
289. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260.
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discretion to restrict access, and therefore, satisfied the "extent of use"
290prong.
After finding the first two factors satisfied, the Kreimer and Main-
stream Loudoun courts examined the third factor, the nature of the
forum.29' To determine the nature of the forum, the Kreimer court looked
at whether the nature of the public library is compatible expressive activ-
ity.292 The court held that the nature of the public library was to assist the
patron in acquiring knowledge through reading and writing.
293 The court
found that other "oral and interactive First Amendment activities" are not
inherent to the nature of a public library.294 The Mainstream Loudoun
court reasoned that the nature of the public library was to promote the
receipt and communication of information, and because Internet users
could receive and communicate information through the computer, the
nature of the public library was consistent with the expressive activity9
C. The Libraries in the ALA Case Are Limited Public Fora
Similar to the Kreimer and Mainstream Loudoun courts, the ALA
Court should have found that the state governments of plaintiff libraries
intended to open the libraries to the public as limited public fora. The
Kreimer and Mainstream Loudoun courts based a showing of govern-
ment intent on whom the library intended to grant access to in order to
satisfy this prong. The libraries' briefs in the ALA case explicitly state
that the vast majority of public libraries, including themselves, have
adopted the American Library Associations' (ALA) Library Bill of
Rights.296 It follows that state public libraries in the ALA case have
evinced clear government intent to operate as limited public fora by
adopting the ALA's Bill of Right's statement; a statement that says the
role of libraries is to provide: "[b]ooks and other ... resources ... for
the interest, information, and enlightenment of all people of the commu-
nity the library serves.' 297 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist quoted the same
statement while examining the role of libraries in society.2 98 Accordingly,
the libraries in the ALA case have satisfied the first factor in the public
forum analysis.
290. Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
291. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260-61; Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
292. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260-61.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
296. Brief of Amici Curiae The Cleveland Public Library et al. at 8, United States v. Am.
Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-36,1) k ...ai.. "'l'he vast majority of public
libraries have adopted the ALA Library Bill of Rights.").
297. ALA Bill of Rights, supra note 166 (reciting the ALA's Library Bill of Rights).
298. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 at 203-04.
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In the same way the libraries in Kreimer and Mainstream Loudoun
proved the second factor, extent of use, the ALA Court should have found
that the libraries in that case could also satisfy this factor. The Kreimer
and Mainstream Loudoun courts looked to the extent of use the govern-
ment allowed and to whether the library has limited its own discretion to
restrict access. The libraries' briefs in the ALA case clearly state that
"public libraries [are open] to any member of the public who enters them
... seeking information."299 In addition, the libraries in the ALA case
have adopted the American Library Associations' Bill of Rights,3°° which
provides that "[a] person's right to use a library should not be denied or
abridged because of origin, age, background, or views."30 ' Based on the
statements of the libraries and the policies they have adopted, the librar-
ies in the ALA case satisfy the extent of use factor.
In the same way the libraries in the ALA case could satisfy the first
two factors of the public forum analysis, the libraries could also show a
sufficient basis for the third. The third prong requires that the nature of
the forum be compatible with expressive activity. The libraries' brief in
the ALA case states that the nature of the public library is "to provide the
information sought by the user."3 2 The Mainstream Loudoun court found
that the nature of the Virginia public library was to promote the receipt
of information. The nature of the libraries in the ALA case and the Main-
stream Loudoun case are almost identical. And similar to the reasoning
in the Mainstream Loudoun case, because the nature of the libraries in
the ALA case is to provide information, it follows that the Internet pro-
vides information to a library patron, and therefore, the nature of the
property is consistent with the expressive activity.
The Court has already showed some acceptance the ALA's interpre-
tation of the purpose of a library: to provide resources for the
enlightenment of the community. Although the government may have a
compelling interest to protect children from certain content obtainable
over the internet, the Court has recognized that public libraries function
as a means for people to obtain ideas that may not be available in more
restrictive environments.303 There is no reason for the Court not to follow
the Third Circuit and the Eastern District of Virgina in their interpreta-
tions of public libraries as limited public fora.
299. Brief of Appellees Multnomah County Public Library et al. at 25, United States v.
Am. Library Ass'n, Inc, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-361).
300. ALA Bill of Rights, supra note 166 and accompanying text.
301. ALA Bill of Rights, supra note 166 and accompanying text.
302. Brief of Amici Curiae The Cleveland Public Library et al. at 7, United States v. Am.
Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-361).
303. See supra note 274 and accompanying text
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D. CIPA Imposes Unconstitutional Conditions
In the ALA case the apellees argued that CIPA imposed an unconsti-
tutional condition on their First Amendment rights because filters block
library patrons' access to constitutionally protected speech.'04 Justice
Rehnquist chose not to directly address whether CIPA violates the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine, explaining that even if the libraries
could assert a claim under this doctrine, it would fail on the merits."
The doctrine provides that Congress cannot attach unconstitutional con-
ditions to the receipt of federal funds.3°6 Instead of addressing the issue,
Rehnquist cited Rust v. Sullivan, and stated, "when the Government ap-
propriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the
limits of that program."307 Rust, however, only applies to situations in
which the government aims to promote a particular message.308 In Rust,
the message and the result were clear: the message favored by the gov-
ernment was that abortion counseling would not be funded,309 the result
was that abortion counseling was not funded.30 In the ALA case the cor-
relation is not so clear.
The message favored by the government in enacting CIPA is that
children should not be exposed to material that is harmful to them, and
the means used to advance this message are Internet filters.3  Internet
filters, however, block large amounts of constitutionally protected speech
and are also under-inclusive, allowing material that is harmful to minors
to sneak through so that minors can access it.312 Since the government
cannot protect children from harmful material given the ineffectiveness
of current filtering technology, the message conveyed is not supported by
the results received. 33 As a result, the government's condition, the filters,
are blocking protected speech; and not the indecent speech that is pro-
tected for only adults, but protected speech for all library patrons.
304. See supra notes 207-209 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
307. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 211 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194
(1991)). See supra notes 212-214 and accompanying text.
308. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (distinguishing Rust
on the ground that "the counseling activities of the doctors ... amounted to government
speech"); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (stat-
ing that, unlike Rust, "the issue of the government's right... to use its own funds to advance a
particular message" was not present).
309. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (rejecting the plaintiffs' claims that they
were entitled to abortion counseling).
311. See supra Part III.C (providing the statutory framework of CIPA).
312. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the ineffectiveness of Internet Filters).
313. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc, 539 U.S. 194, 229 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Therefore, the plurality in the ALA case should have found that Rust does
not apply,t 4 and that CIPA imposes unconstitutional conditions on the
receipt of federal funding.
E. CIPA Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny
When the government designates a limited public forum for expres-
sive activity on a broad range of topics and then content-based
restrictions exclude one of those topics, strict scrutiny applies."' To sur-
vive strict scrutiny, a restriction on speech must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest. '16 The government's interest
in shielding minors from obscene and indecent material, as well as mate-
rial that is harmful to them, is well-established. 3 7 CIPA, therefore, can
satisfy the first prong of strict scrutiny because it is aimed at achieving a
compelling government interest. The statute, however, still fails constitu-
tional muster because the means used to achieve the government interest
are not narrowly tailored.
A statute is narrowly tailored "so long as the ... regulation promotes
a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation."" ' Given the vast amount of legitimate Web sites
Internet filters block, CIPA cannot pass the narrowly tailored prong of
strict scrutiny because protecting children from harmful Internet content
could be achieved more effectively without the statute.
The district court in the ALA case found that commercially available
filters block thousands of Web sites that are clearly not harmful to mi-
nors.3' 9 These sites include the "California Jewish Community Center,"
the Web site for "Wisconsin Right to Life," and the "Willis-Knighton
Cancer Center."32 The court further found, relying on evidence presented
by the government's expert witness, that between 6% and 15% of Web
sites blocked by filters used in public libraries contained no content that
could be deemed harmful to minors. 2'
The plurality in the ALA case did not dispute any of these findings.
The Court also did not, however, afford these findings any substantial
weight and instead focused on the fact that CIPA allows Internet users to
ask a librarian to disable the filter for bona fide research.322 But this ar-
314. See id.
315. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,460 (2002).
316. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
317. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
318. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
319. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
320. See id. at 446-48.
321. See id. at 475.
322. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 209 (2003).
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gument is unpersuasive considering the evidence presented to the district
court, evidence that unblocking could take days and could even be un-
available to users at branch libraries, which are typically understaffed.
323
Additionally, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence clearly states that law-
ful speech may not be blocked in an effort to block 
unlawful speech.32
4
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,23 the Court held that "[t]he ar-
gument ... that protected speech may be banned as a means to ban
unprotected speech ... turns the First Amendment upside down.
326 Fol-
lowing this reasoning, blocking material that is suitable for minors and
adults while aiming to block material that is potentially harmful to mi-
nors is unconstitutional. While CIPA on its face requires the suppression
of only unprotected constitutional speech, it is impossible for current
filtering technology to comply with CIPA without blocking protected
speech. Filters, therefore, are not a narrowly tailored means to achieve
the government interest of protecting children from inappropriate Inter-
net material. Accordingly, the Court should have looked at less
restrictive alternatives.
The District Court in the ALA case found a variety of less restrictive
alternatives available to public libraries.32 To prevent patrons from ac-
cessing illegal material, such as child pornography, public libraries could
institute computer use policies and impose penalties on patrons who vio-
late these policies . 2 Libraries could also require parental consent for
minors who want to use the terminals filter-free, or restrict minors' unfil-
tered searching to computers visible to library staff.
329 In addition,
alternatives such as optional filtering, recessed monitors, and privacy
screens could also be implemented and serve as less restrictive alterna-
tives."
323. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 411 (2002).
324. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 222 (2003) (citing Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)).
325. 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (holding that the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA),
which banned virtual child pornography, was unconstitutional because it also banned a sub-
stantial amount of protected speech).
326. Id. at 254; see also United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814
(2000) ("(Tlhe objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the
protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative"); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 875 (1997) (The "governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials...
does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults."); Broad-
rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) ("[T]he possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected
speech of others may be muted... ").
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CONCLUSION
Mandatory filters supplant necessary parental control and education.
Someone has to decide what material is suitable for minors, and CIPA
leaves this decision to private companies that develop Internet filters and
libraries that implement those filters. 3 Private companies hire employ-
ees to review Web sites and make a determination as to what kind of
material should be blocked.332 Essentially, private companies and their
employees choose what kind of material is appropriate for America's
youth. CIPA expressly prohibits federal interpretation of what content is
appropriate for minors, leaving the determination to local communi-
ties.333 This scheme provides, however, for librarians, not parents, to
determine what type of material is harmful since they are in control of
the filtering software. The problem is that what one family deems harm-
ful to minors can vary greatly from what another family deems harmful
to minors. Granting private companies or librarians the power to decide
what content is harmful to minors puts them in a parenting role, a posi-
tion beyond the realm of their duties. Children's levels of maturity,
emotional stability, and rates of development and learning vary too much
for a third party commercial entity to decide what kind Internet material
is appropriate. Determining what content children view is a decision for
the parents. Privacy screens, restricted passwords, and secluded Internet
terminals may be less restrictive alternatives to filters, but all are inferior
to education. Rather than preparing children for the world they will live
in, these alternatives are preparing them for a world that no longer exists.
331. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
